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What a precious theme is harvest! The
hopes, the well being, the life of the
world is fast bound up in the magic of
this single word.
- Dr. J. H. Worst, Kansas State
Agricultural College (KSAC) , a
soldier in the wheat army.
Introduction
. . . the fight for bread, the most
elementary question of human existence,
- Lenin
Preservation of society is dependent upon the material
sustenance of the people. Maintenance of an adequate food
supply is the principal objective of any legitimate state.
Industrialization and urbanization have stretched the
"umbilical cord" which binds country and city. Disruption
of the food chain linking rural producers and urban
consumers usually results in domestic chaos and eventual
civil strife. Harmony and equilibrium between farmers
and city dwellers is particularly threatened by the
extraordinary demands upon society created by war.
World War I (1914-1918) illustrates the complex
relationships of an economically interdependent world.
With their agricultural economies derailed by the
immensity of that conflagration, the Entente powers of
Western Europe looked outward to supplement their meager
rations of foodstuffs.
Farms of the fertile Mississippi Valley of North
America, the plains of Canada and Argentina provided the
1
food needed to erase the deficit in Europe. In the United
States (U.S.) a program of food control headed by young
industrialist Herbert Hoover was remarkably successful
in feeding the working class of Europe. American food
was decisive in the eventual Allied victory and the
consolidation of the U.S. as an economic superpower.
Historian Witold Sworakowski writes "In a war in which
hunger was used with callous deliberation as a strategic
weapon, the crucial battle fought and won on the home
front under Hoover's leadership
. . . prevented internal
collapse in the Allied countries as a result of deficient
food supplies.
"
Agriculturalists in the U.S. viewed the war as a
battle versus German farmers and their militaristic
government. In the vast grain belt of the midwestern U.S.
the effort to increase food production resembled a
military campaign. As a national leader in wheat
production the state of Kansas responded vigorously to
the nation's call to "win the war with wheat." Kansas
was challenged to be the first state in the union to plant
ten million acres to a single crop. The movement to grow
more food in Kansas was based upon the organizational,
emotional and economic themes prevalent in American
society in World War I. To attain the collective goal of
more wheat for the war effort the "wheat soldiers" united
to overcome several obstacles. In 1917 and 1918 the
2
mobilization to meet emergency demands regimented every
aspect of society for the cause. In Kansas the wheat
campaign was a general success because of effective
professional leadership and a spirit of patriotism which
motivated the entire state. It was a pragmatic
mobilization.
Nutritious, storable and transportable, wheat was the
staple commodity on the international food market in the
World War I period. Wheat was so vital to the war effort
that the U.S. Congress passed the Food Control Act in 1916
and established the U.S. Food Administration in 1917 to
control it and other foodstuffs. The national leadership
of Herbert Hoover effectively promoted food production and
control. Hoover seemed to be a genuinely popular figure
among the farm population. Nonetheless, the food campaign
was a centrifugal, "inside-out" mobilization. State and
local initiative enabled the emergency war effort to
succeed.
Patriotism and organization were two central themes
in the movement to harvest more wheat in Kansas. State
pride and native love of country were harnessed by the
political leaders and print media of the state. At times
this spirit of pro patria led to excessive measures against
those citizens considered to be less than enthusiastic
towards the war. The morale of Kansans was crucial to the
effort to provide more food for the nation's strategic
arsenal.
Organization of the wheat campaign embraced many of
the tenets of the progressive scientific outlook.
Professional, industrial, financial, educational and
agricultural elites comprised the leadership level of the
mobilization in Kansas. The professional class intervened
with committees that were established on the county,
township and community level. Their role was to oversee
the tactical implementation of the wheat campaign plans.
Most of the workers in the organizing committees were
volunteers and several members of the faculty at Kansas
State Agricultural College (KSAC) were essential leaders
in the program's success. Much effort was made to utilize
surveys, statistical analysis and scientific farming
methods to increase the yield of Kansas farms at harvest
time
.
Patriotism and organizations were essential to the
implementation of the food production campaign, but the
profit motive also weighed heavily in the drive to expand
wheat acreage. For the first time in U.S. history the
federal government tampered with the marketplace and fixed
a two dollar per bushel price for hard red winter wheat.
This move by President Woodrow Wilson persuaded growers to
plant more wheat; no longer would they fear a downturn in
prices if the war ended. The guaranteed price also calmed
4
consumer fears about continually increased bread prices
and ended the rampant speculation by foreign governments
and grain traders on the Chicago commodity markets
.
Due to poor weather the wheat crop of 1916-1917 was
the worst in several years. Wheat growers in Kansas faced
an extreme shortage of quality hybrid seed wheat to plant
in the fall of 1917. A statewide publicity and fund
raising effort located available seed wheat and helped
cash short farmers purchase their seed. Private groups
and individuals who provided funds for seed wheat
purchases received one-fifth of the crop when harvested.
Seed was distributed to producers who had been successful
in the past and those growers who prepared their seed bed
early and thoroughly were favored in seed wheat
allocations
.
Central to the expansion of acreage was the wholesale
introduction of mechanized agriculture into the state. A -
survey of literature from the period reveals the profound
effect of tractors in replacing lost labor and breaking
more sod to plant to wheat. "Power farming" allowed for
the industrialization of farming, an inevitable trend which
the war ushered in en masse. Tractors and combines were
expensive to purchase and maintain; a cycle of credit
financing which has since plagued the state has its roots
in World War I and the post-war period.
A major threat to the wheat campaign was the lack of
5
available labor to harvest the crop in the summer of 1918.
Wartime mobilization agencies moved to solve the labor
shortage. State leaders called for a draft deferment for
skilled farmers. Women, children, retired farmers, out of
state labor, vagrants and city dwellers were mobilized to
harvest the ripened wheat. National newspapers recruited
harvest laborers and railroad companies offered reduced
rates to harvesters seeking transport into the state. No
wheat was lost for lack of labor.
Grain standards, storage and shipping were additional
problems which confronted the wheat producers of Kansas.
The progressive ideas of pure food and railway regulation
were challenged by the demands and strains of the war
emergency. Protests by farm groups lessened the tough new
grain standards and a permit system alleviated the storage
and transport crisis.
When the harvest was gathered in the summer of 1918
the crop was less than hoped for due to another rough
winter which killed a vast portion of the crop.
Nonetheless, the crop was still quite large and was
crucial to the war effort. The war effort in Kansas set
a standard for selfless determination and efficient
organization for the benefit of the common good. The war
effort would culminate in a record acreage of wheat in
1919.
War brought prosperity to Kansas and capped the
6
"golden age" of agriculture in the state. Inflated land
values and crop prices caused overproduction and post-war
deflation and depression that was to last nearly two
decades after the war's end. The wheat army of Kansas
held the line and helped win the war. The soldier of the
wheatfield was an outstanding feature of the dynamic
wartime mobilization in the U.S.
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Wheat, Strategy and Grand Strategy
At the time of World War I wheat flour was the staple
of the working class in Europe. The grain has high
caloric value and can be stored for long periods. North
American wheat was attractive because it was closer to
Europe than the granaries of South America, India and
China. On the other hand, America's great store of corn
was not adaptable to the flour mills of Europe, nor were
Europeans interested in consuming corn.
War however, disrupted the agricultural economy of
Europe and created the demand for foodstuffs. With
France's best wheat acreage occupied by the German Army
and with Russia's poor transportation links, the loss
could not be made up before the collapse of the Romanov
regime in the spring of 1917. Agricultural labor machinery
and fertilizers were also in short supply, as the munitions
industry had siphoned resources from agriculture. French
wheat production was down fifty percent in 1917 from the
1914 level. Further aggravating the problem were the
devastating German U-Boat attacks and the emphasis on
naval shipping at the expense of the merchant marine.
Breadstuff s from Australia, India and Asia were effectively
9
cut off from Western Europe. American food had to fill
the void to keep the Allies in the war.
Economic historian Gerd Hardach writes: "Food supply-
provides a particularly clear example of the extent to
which civilian requirements were subordinated to
2
armaments." Strict regimentation of foodstuffs occurred
in the belligerent nations. In Germany all state and idle
lands were planted to crops and a Spartan rationing system
was enforced. In Britain the normal concentration upon
livestock raising was shifted to the production of cereal
grains. Though the U.S. had lost a great deal of the
European food market before the war, it became the
lifeline to the armies and workers in the Allied camp,
especially when the U.S. entered the war in April 1917.
As it had since the Napoleonic wars, the U.S.
provided sustenance to the belligerent powers of Europe.
Since the Louisiana Purchase and the rail and canal
connection to Chicago in the 1830s American food and
4
cotton had fueled the industrial revolution. Britain was
particularly dependent upon imported grain, by 1914 "Four
out of every five slices of bread the British ate . . .
were made from wheat grown abroad." U.S. farm exports to
Europe were valued at 142 million dollars in 1913, by 1918
they were worth 505 million dollars per year.
As the year 1918 began the Entente powers were
producing 213 million fewer bushels of wheat than the
10
7pre-war average. Early in the spring of 1917 the Allied
powers had entered the Chicago futures market causing
prices to soar and making tens of millions of dollars of
profit for grain speculators. American consumer groups,
angered at rising food prices, called for an embargo of
food exports. When America entered the war the Allies
needed 577 million bushels to feed their people and the
U.S. surplus was only 200 million bushels. A drastic
program of food conservation and production was needed to
o
avert a crisis in food supply.
In April 1917 the U.S. faced a crisis in food supply
which increased as prices continued to climb. The
anticipated 900 million bushel wheat crop of 1917 only
reached the 630 million bushel level. A battle ensued
among exporters, consumers and farmers. Food prices rose
46 percent from July 1916 to April 1917. Chicago bakeries
were nearly ransacked by angry consumers incensed over a
50 percent increase in bread prices. Under these
circumstances the Wilson Administration "singled out wheat
for special consideration as it attempted to mobilize
9
agriculture for war."
On 9 and 10 April 1917 Secretary of Agriculture David
Houston chaired a conference of farm leaders, educators
from agricultural colleges and publishers from the farm
belt. Midwestern farmers were isolationists generally, and
not in favor of U.S. involvement in the European war. But
11
the farmers had solidarity with Belgium, "that little
nation which, singlehanded, defended the gateway to
liberty." Houston charged that: "The duty of the
individual farmer, at this time, is to increase his
production.
"
The United States Food Administration was created
under the provision of the Lever-Food Control Act, passed
by Congress on 10 August 1917. Young mining engineer
Herbert Hoover, who had led the campaign for food relief
to Belgium after 1914, was appointed as the federal food
administrator
.
Hoover was given the power to buy and sell food,
prevent hoarding and speculation, offer guaranteed prices,
fix margin trading, suspend futures trading and to
organize and control the food industry and transportation
lines. In keeping with Hoover's aversion to
"bureaucracies," the food administration was composed
primarily of volunteers. Of the nearly eleven thousand
employees, 9,000 were in the field instead of riding
desks in Washington, D.C. Hoover rallied the nation's
farmers by writing that they could unleash the "great
potentialities of the United States as a factor in
bringing this cataclysm to an end that will mean victory
12
and future peace on earth."
Hoover was accepted as the "autocrat of the breakfast
table" in spite of some rural resentment about being
12
"exhorted and preached at by men who do not understand"
13farming. Public support of Hoover and his programs is
indicated in a passage from Country Gentleman
, a popular
farm journal:
because of his training in large business
affairs that sharpened him for battles of
trading, price fluctuation and commodity
economics: because of a perceptive mind
that sees into the heart of a problem and
dares not . . . seek a radical solution. 14
13
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Wheat State at War: Patriotism and Organization
Kansans responded with vigor to the nation's charge
"to win the war with wheat." Publisher turned Governor
Arthur Capper guided the emotional shift in support of the
war. As a pacifist Governor Capper was known as an
outspoken opponent of American involvement in a European
conflict. Preparedness movements had not been supported
in the state and President Woodrow Wilson had been coolly
received on a visit to Kansas in late 1916. Before
America entered the war Kansas was truly a hotbed of
isolationism.
As the bread basket of the nation Kansas was vital to
Hoover and Wilson. The national leadership had to enlist
the state into the mobilization. The President, the food
administrator and the Secretary of Agriculture appealed
to state pride and native love of country to rouse the
consciousness of the citizenry. Pacifist ideology was
resoundly banished from Kansas as Capper led the state
into the war to end all wars and make the world safe for
democracy. Capper wrote of isolationism: "That time is
past, and now we must get behind all those things which
will help win the war."
16
Kansas food would be one of "those things"; heartfelt
patriotic virtue was invaluable in stimulating the
mobilization of agriculture. Winning the war would mean
sacrifice and hard work; it would cost men, food and
money. It would take morale. In an open letter to his
constituents Capper wrote "let's all be equally patriotic,
each giving according to his means. ... It will make
2
the nation unconquerable." He also admonished Kansans
to "plan simpler dressing, simpler social life, simpler
living [to] preserve our health and resources." It was
time to place patriotism over politics. Capper urged the
federal government to "pay as we go" in order that the
next generation would not be forced to foot the cost of
the war.
Kansas Farmer contributed to the military ethos of
the ensuing wheat campaign, realizing that "without
abundant food the whole great enterprise upon which we
4
embark will break down and fall." The journal called
for a "plan of attack" to confront the food problem.
Cereal grain production was the pressing need, but Kansas
farms would also contribute fruit, vegetables, and meat.
Kansas farmers were reminded that "A Kansas soldier never
sleeps at his post whether he is serving in the trenches
or the furrows."
Noted historian Robert D. Cuff has explained the
Wilsonian mobilization as an attempt to "discipline the
17
competitive pluralism and possessive individualism of the
„7
nation." The challenges of war tended to "encourage a
romantic impulse for community among the American people
Expressions of that patriotism were rampant as an
outpouring of support for the war effort ignited
mobilization.
Kansans enlisted in the armed forces, joined canning
clubs, planted "liberty gardens," bought war bonds and
volunteered for the Red Cross. KSAC president Henry J.
Waters was deluged with offers from students seeking to
8provide county leadership in the food production drive.
Students even plowed up parts of campus to plant more
acres and called for a removal of "pro-German" instructors
from the school. Waters received one letter, signed
"Patriot," which asserted without supplying evidence, that
"there is a German sympathizer on the college force, Louis
H. Limper, he should be fired without any delay in my
opinion . . . if he dares talk before me I will settle
with him personally and promptly." In spite of these
charges Professor Limper stayed on the faculty until
retirement.
A film, "aptly entitled" "Winning the War with Wheat,"
was produced by the state to further heighten resident
patriotism. Five copies of the film were rushed through
the state in cars and shown on a train which traversed
Kansas. Its theme advocated the special need for more
18
wheat and outlined methods to increase yields.
One character in the film, a teenage boy, convinces
his father to plant a test plot on ground that was
prepared early and thoroughly. The son's crop outyielded
his father's wheat by several bushels per acre. A young
lady enters the story at this point, having come to
Kansas to rehabilitate her alcoholic father. The old man
"plows a strait furrow" and boy meets girl, marries her
and plants more wheat to beat the Kaiser. Henry Waters
of KSAC suggested this visual imagery was particularly
effective in promoting the wheat campaign to farmers who
were tired of turgid lectures and pamphleteering. One
young cadre apparently took the message to heart: "I am
thirteen years old ... I have a hoe for a gun and the
weeds are my Germans."
Lip service to the war effort would not suffice;
"Being a loyal American . . . meant not only supporting
vocally important national policies, but also participation
and involvement in various kinds of war work. Individuals
and factions suspected of less than enthusiastic support
of the war were identified, cajoled and sometimes harassed
12
and humiliated."
German-speaking Kansans were particularly subject to
persecution. German language instruction at public
schools was abolished and the use of German on the
telephone was forbidden. Many ethnic Germans were
19
compelled to burn their German language books. Governor
Capper received an enormous amount of correspondence
"revealing" those individuals who were "slackers" in their
effort towards the war. Mennonites, Russelites (Jehovah's
Witnesses), Mexican laborers, conscientious objectors,
labor agitators, socialists and others with pacifist
inclination were targeted by zealots intent upon keeping
Kansas "pure" in the war. At times this patriotic
hysteria resulted in physical intimidation, including
13
several tar and feather incidents.
One group that felt the wrath of Kansas patriots was
the radical International Workers of the World (IWW)
.
This fraternity preached "unabashed class warfare" and
sought to "organize all workers, skilled and unskilled,
into a single union which would eventually seize control
of industry." Kansans feared the IWW would infiltrate
the camps of migratory farm laborers and disrupt and
sabotage the wheat harvest. There may have been some
reason for this fear as by the fall of 1916 the IWW
claimed 18,000 members in the grain belt.
Popular fear of the "wobblies , " as IWW members were
known, is illustrated in this recollection from The
Frankfort Story :
At 12:00 A.M. on a cool fall night during
World War I . . . men were heard running up
and down the streets of Frankfort . . . and
. .
. seen toting guns. ... We women
folks soon learned that the International
20
Workers of the World (better known as the
I.W.W. 's or I won't work organization) were
headed north from Wamego tearing down
telephone wires and burning homes ....
Frankfort's crack Home Guard went into
action . . . 8 or 10 men marched with guns
on their shoulders to protect the four
entrances to Frankfort. 5
IWW members did not engage the Frankfort Home Guard
that night, the IWW sabotage was actually a fire started
along a railway. Instead they faced a tougher enemy, U.S.
Attorney General Fred Robertson, a Kansas version of J.
Edgar Hoover. Robertson was noted to hold "an expansive
1
6
view of the law." (He even investigated Governor Capper
to determine his attitude toward the war.) Robertson
arrested 2 8 members of the IWW in 1917 and they remained
incarcerated without trial for two years. IWW members
succeeded in publicizing the pitiable conditions of Kansas
jails. Robertson had made Kansas nationally distinguished
*~ *. • .17for its excesses xn war spirit.
Retiring executive secretary of the Kansas State
Historical Society William E. Connelley said in 1918 that
Kansas in the war was a "state of extremists"; the state
was a "famous, if not notorious" source for ridicule from
the rest of the nation. The historian was concerned by
the sudden shift from pacifism to militarism. Evidently
the drive to increase food production had worked beyond
1
8
the parameters of wheat and pork.
Exuberance towards the war was sometimes manifested
21
in jingoistic and mob-like responses to perceived threats.
Yet morale was essential to mobilizing the population to
support the war effort. Overeagerness notwithstanding,
Kansas in World War I was a land of consensus: an "island
19
of calm in a sea of bigotry."
Morale alone is not enough to win modern battles.
Organization of the wheat campaign was vital to its
success. Prominent historian Ellis Hawley asserts "the
war experience of 1917 and 1918 catalyzed the process of
organizational change and set the pattern for future
economic and social management."
Many historians have viewed the war as a negative
reverse of progressive reform which dominated the early
twentieth century. This school holds that the war
mobilization was a period of oppressive bureaucratization
and hinting of collectivization. Actually organization
for war highlighted the social and economic trends that
had developed in the decades before the war. Economic
leaders such as Hoover in the U.S. and Walter Rathenau of
Germany were keen that the war had ushered in an age of
21
consolidation and interdependence.
In the American West the war symbolized the demise
of the traditional Turnerian frontier epoch. Rugged
individualism and social simplicity were traits that had
to adapt to increased regulation of society and economy
of scale.
22
America's wartime buildup crowned the professional
era that had emerged from the laissez faire 19th century.
Efficiency and economic expansion were trademarks of the
war effort. In an emergency the professional elite of
the U.S. reigned over the economy to facilitate the
mobilization and effect societal change. War on the
homefront was fought with statistical surveys, calculated
22
efficiency and other vestiges of American corporatism.
Within the framework of the Army Appropriations Act
of 1916 was the provision to create the Council of National
Defense. Initially the Council enrolled 750,000 volunteers
to distribute posters and leaflets which promoted the food
programs and liberty bond purchases. Washington enjoyed
nominal control over the various state councils but the
work of the State Council, in the words, again, of William
J. Breen, was an "inside-out" mobilization. Direct action
was taken by the 184,000 state, county and local Councils
23
of Defense
Governors and state legislatures determined the power
of the State Council; in Kansas the council was considered
"partisan" and generally echoed the views of Governor
Capper. As Homer Socolofsky writes: "The vast majority
of Kansans accepted Capper as a sincere and willing
24interpreter of public feeling in the state."
Since his election in 1914 Capper advocated "the
abolition of unnecessary boards and consolidation where
23
25possible." Pragmatic leadership is evidenced by KSAC
President Henry Waters' letter to Capper's assistant
Marco Morrow in respect to the state (and nation's) first
Food Conference in March 1917. Waters wrote that he
wanted the meeting to "not prove to be merely a talk-fest
2 fi
. . . some definite program should evolve from it."
Immediately after the U.S. declaration of war on 7
April 1917 Capper called into existence the Kansas State
Council of Defense. Prominent citizens, among them
successful farmers, millers, industrialists, educators,
railroad representatives and publishers formed the core
of the State Council. Ranking members included literary
great William Allen White and salt magnate Emerson
Carey. The Council divided itself into eight sections
corresponding with the state's Congressional districts.
Sundry committees formed to plan and oversee county
organization, finance, highways, labor, public defense
and so on. William Jardine, a future Secretary of
Agriculture, headed the important Agricultural Production
Committee. Waters served as President of the Council
until he took a post with a Kansas City newspaper and
later a high office in the Food Administration. Capper
addressed the first meeting and charged the State Council
"with a responsibility graver than any that has faced our
people---the providing of the sinews of war. „27
Among the first ac:tions of the Kansas Council were
24
resolutions passed calling for a federal food administrator
(which they received in Hoover) , increased credit for
farmers, larger planting of staple crops, to increase the
fight against insects and plant disease. Also there was
support for national prohibition, women's suffrage, and
government regulation of mill prices. A first move was to
send out 5,000 questionnaires to ascertain the supply of
2 8
seed wheat in the state.
A "general program" devised by the State Council
demanded the subjugation of the state economy to the war
effort. Banking, industry, labor and other sectors were
mobilized along with the agricultural producers. Students
and city residents were asked to go to the fields to help
out. A fund of $500,000 was to be established to supply
29
seed wheat to "needy" farmers.
State Council members were volunteers motivated
principally by social consciousness. Through the
committee system the wartime mobilization permeated
throughout the fibers of society. The elite composition
of the State Council evidently caused some concern among
the more egalitarian citizens of Kansas. Nonetheless the
council was useful in publicizing and regimenting the
u 30wheat campaign.
Actual planning and implementation of the State
Council programs was aided by the State Board of
Agriculture, the state branch of the United States
25
Department of Agriculture (USDA) . One commentator even
suggested "the chief function of the State Council was to
31
carry out Department of Agriculture plans." The 1917-
1918 Report of the State Board of Agriculture was more
charitable, noting: "When the Kansas Council of Defense
was organized the entire machinery of the State Board was
32
placed at its disposal."
In the World War I period the role of the Department
of Agriculture and the State Boards were three-fold:
1). To make scientific studies of agricultural problems,
2). To distribute information on experimental farming
procedures, and 3). To administer Acts of Congress in
33
relation to agriculture.
On 9 and 10 April 1917 Secretary of Agriculture David
Houston met in St. Louis with state agriculture
commissioners, presidents of agriculture colleges,
publishers and other farm groups. Out of the conference
was the genesis of the wartime emergency legislation for
agriculture. Price incentives and patriotism were to
motivate farmers to produce more food. The program was
to be handled by local farm organizations and through the
support of the press.
Important to Department of Agriculture plans were the
system of agriculture extension networks. These had been
established to study and communicate scientific methods in
farming by experimentation and demonstration. Fortunately
26
the extension network was organized and funded by Congress
in the years preceding the war. Wartime emergencies
"intensified and increased the amount of work done" by the
35
extension agencies.
In Kansas the extension network organized
demonstrations of farming techniques as well as methods
designed to help farmers solve problems at the township
level. Each county was allotted $1200 to hire a man and
woman agent for a year. (The man received $8 00 of that
sum. ) Before the war only 17 counties in Kansas had
extension agents. They worked with the county Councils of
Defense to confront problems of labor, seed, machinery,
insects, food preservation and other difficulties under
the "Emergency Farm Bureau" program.
Cooperative extension services were funded by a
combination of federal, state and local monies. Federal
funding for the extension program for 1918 was 117,632
37dollars. The remainder of funds came from the state
3 8legislature, KSAC and county treasuries.
Among the valuable functions of the extension network
was to inventory the resources available to the war
effort. An edition of Farmers Mail and Breeze boasted
that "Kansas is probably the only state in the Union to
send a complete survey of resources to Herbert Hoover,
39
national food director."
County agents in Kansas provided extensive assistance
27
to the wheat campaign. Extension services included giving
100,000 bushels of seed wheat to 2,080 farms which allowed
74,003 acres of wheat to be planted. Agents also visited
7,110 farms, received 17,209 calls and throughout the war
they conducted 3,097 meetings which were attended by
40147,046 persons.
Extension workers explained food conservation
procedures, oversaw highway construction and irrigation
projects, and created correspondence courses for farmers
who wanted to learn about tractors or other new implements.
By late 1917 14,000 boys and girls were members of canning
clubs which planted gardens and preserved food. Congress
had seen the need for "emergency appropriations for
extension use with specific reference to food production."
Evidently these programs were so well-received by farmers
41
that they were extended after the war.
KSAC worked with the extension service to conduct the
wheat campaign. Not only did college students pledge
themselves to the effort, "members of the faculty . . .
were constantly occupied in speaking or writing in the
interest of an increase in the production of food." A
movement to make Henry Waters Secretary of Agriculture
failed, but he was eventually a powerful member of the
42Food Administration.
Patriotic and professionally organized, the Wheat
Army was activated for battle. Morale was high and the
28
cost of mobilization was relatively inexpensive due to
its volunteer nature. "Over the top" were a myriad of
obstacles in the path to victory.
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"Two Dollar Wheat": Federal Price Support
of the Wheat Campaign
Concern over grain prices was the first threat to
the wartime wheat crop of 1917-1918. Due to dry and cold
winters Kansas had suffered two successive poor harvests.
Kansas growers hesitated; heavy planting in the fall
could meet with bad weather and more disaster; a bumper
crop could mean oversupply and low prices, especially if
the war came to a sudden end. Economic survival was
paramount to the farmers in the state in a land where "the
matter of a few inches of rain [will] either buy them
motor cars or wipe out their bank accounts." A Kansas
farmer that summer could have said "if the government
shares the risk, we're game."
Governor Arthur Capper expressed the concern of the
state in a letter to Herbert Hoover. Capper wrote
"Unfortunately for the world the growing of food cannot
simply be made a matter of patriotism. It has to be a
2
question of dollars and cents." Henry Waters warned
that farmers might not even plant a normal acreage of
wheat if not insured against economic risk. A one million
acre reduction was predicted if an acceptable price was
34
fixed before planting. Waters called for a two dollar
3per bushel price at primary markets.
President Wilson's food dilemma was to support U.S.
allies, mollify farmers and constrain consumers fearful
of inflated food prices. Julius Barnes, a major grain
dealer and Food Administration executive noted later:
"Wheat and the products of wheat became war munitions,
and war munitions are bought with a ruthless disregard of
4
all commercial factors."
Consumers were angered at the rapid rise of foodstuff
prices in early 1917. Their disdain was heightened when
the Entente powers heavily entered the speculative
commodity futures market and sent wheat prices on an
upward spiral. Soon urban consumer groups, including
housewives and some national newspapers called for a ban
on food exports to Europe.
Farmers were incensed over the embargo movement,
which they viewed as an unfair restraint on high prices
which they deserved. Kansas producers and politicians
sided with the national government against calls for an
embargo. Henry Waters worked with the National Foreign
Trade council to avert the cutoff of food to Europe and
Julius Barnes met receptive audiences when he toured the
grain belt giving speeches to fight the embargo. The
price crisis highlighted the reality with a somewhat
exaggerated concern: "American wheat is the dominating
35
factor in the war crisis; Allied nations must buy here;
neutrals must buy here; and our own people must get their
daily supplies of wheat flour."
Producers and consumers were able to agree on how to
oppose what Arthur Capper called the "illegal and corrupt
manipulation" by the farmer's traditional enemy—the
"middlemen"—the speculators, grain dealers, millers,
bakers and railroads. In the futures frenzy in the spring
of 1917 commodity brokers had profited by an estimated
o
50 million dollars per month.
Arthur Capper attacked the "several hundred firms of
speculators" and "food gamblers" who were hoarding large
amounts of food to inflate prices artificially. Capper
felt that price manipulation was "criminal ... a crime
against the consumer and producer . . . prison is too good
for such men.
"
It was the task of the Food Administration to rein in
the food trusts. The Kansas Farmer endorsed its support
for Hoover's position in this area: "It certainly looks
as though the food administrator means business in . . .
treatment of firms or individuals who attempt to make
9
unlawful profits as a result of war conditions."
Woodrow Wilson reminded the farm population that
the "fate of the war and the fate of nations" depended
upon American food. Wilson promised farmers to halt
profiteering and to assist them with price support.
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Henry Waters was seated on a national committee which
reported to Wilson that "a fair price should be based
upon the cost of production and a reasonable profit."
"Demoralize prices in either direction," warned Julius
Barnes, "and the whole machinery of the world's granary
12
will be wrecked." The New Republic led 5,000 national
newspapers in an editorial call for a guaranteed price
for wheat.
On 10 August 1918 the Food Control Act was signed by
President Wilson. Hoover was given the power to fix
prices and replace the "middlemen" and speculators.
After initial rumors that the wheat price would be set at
$1.50 per bushel (much to the dismay of farmers), the
price was established at $2.00 per bushel at primary,
14local markets and $2.25 in Chicago.
The farmer was still disappointed at the two-dollar
price, but reconciled his "financial disappointment with
his patriotism. " He was upset that wheat was the only
crop with a fixed price. Seed, labor, and machinery
costs were also rising steadily. The wheat grower was
"neither a profiteer nor entirely self-sacrificing."
Capper believed it was the farmer's "business, his duty,
to make his farm yield the largest possible income."
Farmers operated on a small percentage of profit, lack of
government support at this time would have been a serious
blow to the wheat campaign. Farmers likely would not
37
have expanded wheat acreage without financial support.
Late and hesitant, the federal government intervened
in the marketplace in an effective manner. With a price
guarantee the wheat grower of Kansas promised to "rise to
the emergency and act out of patriotism [to] put out ten
1
6
million acres of wheat this fall." National support for
the wheat campaign reminded the ranks of the Wheat Army
that the "Soldier of the wheatfield—as important today
17
as the soldier on the field of battle."
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Sowing; The Seed Wheat Crisis and
Seed Bed Preparation
Ten million acres sown to wheat with a 200 million
bushel harvest were the stated goals for the Kansas wheat
campaign in the fall of 1917. This would eclipse the
record million bushel crop of 1914. If successful the
fields of Kansas would produce in 1918 more grain than
the entire U.S. had exported the previous year, for the
first time a single state, Kansas, would plant over 10
million acres to a single crop. Three orders were
directed to the wheat soldiers: 1) . To secure early and
thorough preparation of the seed bed, 2) . To obtain a
sufficient supply of quality seed, and 3) . To expand wheat
1
acreage.
To avert a shortage of quality seed wheat was the most
important campaign objective. Patriotism, organization
and price support would mean little without seed to
plant in the soil. Seed wheat was in short supply due to
the winter kill and subsequent poor harvest in 1917. Of
the 8.5 million acres planted in the fall of 1916, over
four million was lost to the hostile winter of 1916-1917.
Surrounding states, such as Nebraska had faced even
41
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worse weather, thus having no spare seed for Kansas.
Hybrid grades of seed wheat was needed for improved
yields. Quality strains were difficult to locate and high
priced—up to $3.00 per bushel. Arthur Capper announced
that farmers in western Kansas would need two million
bushels of seed wheat. The governor believed "A fund of
five million dollars might be necessary" to supply the
seed deficient areas. A Farmers Mail and Breeze editorial
barked: "We intend to talk about ten million acres . . .
until we have every farmer in the state looking for more
land to sow, and pleading for seed." Henry Waters
reasoned that such an acreage was needed when "Every
pound of bread we supply to our allies may mean one less
3
of our soldiers buried in France."
Herbert Hoover defined food administration as "the
intelligent co-ordination of all the forces in the country
to solve specific food difficulties and problems." A
concentrated effort to locate seed wheat was orchestrated
by the State Council of Defense, the State Board of
Agriculture, the Governor's office, KSAC, the state
Agricultural Commissioner and the Santa Fe Railroad. A
"flying squadron" of 20 men in Ford cars scoured the
state in search of quality hard, red winter wheat seed,
particularly 570 Turkey, 762 Crimean, 392 Kharkov and the
4hybrid Kanred strains.
Over 4.6 million bushels of seed was located, mainly
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in the central/south-central region of Kansas. Harper
County led the tally with 668,194 bushels of seed
available. Lists of "reputable" suppliers were published
in newspapers and periodicals and school children surveyed
the sprouting capabilities of several thousand different
samples of seed wheat and reported their findings to KSAC.
Once seed was located the problem became a question
of finance. Governor Capper wanted to form a coalition of
land, capital and labor. Capper also telegraphed Hoover
and Secretary Houston to plead for financial assistance
for seed wheat purchases. U.S. Senator Charles Curtis
(GOP Kansas) replied to Capper that some assistance might
6
come from the War Finance Corporation.
To fund seed wheat purchases a two million dollar
pool was established by the Kansas Millers Associations,
the American and Kansas Banker's Associations and the
Farmer's Union. Waters was in charge of the fund to
assist "deficient counties." A "crop gamble" scheme was
also devised to finance more wheat planting. The plan was
to organize financiers who would receive one-fifth of the
harvested crop by supplying the capital for expansion.
A grower was not allowed to pasture animals on the shared
wheat without permission of his loan partner. County
committees overlooked the separation of grain at harvest.
Efficient farmers on 1,000-1,500 acre farms were
targeted for financial assistance. If growers rejected
43
the crop sharing plan they often had the option to defer
two-fifths of their seed purchase price until harvest
8time.
After the seed wheat crisis was put aside in late
summer of 1917 the emphasis shifted to expansion of
acreage and seed bed preparation. A survey was circulated
to assess the available amount of land for wheat. An
estimated 8,850,000 acres were immediately available to
plant— 3,315,000 in corn stubble, 3,651,000 in wheat
9
stubble and 1,075,000 in vital fallow ground.
Eventually 9,480,000 acres of wheat were planted in
Kansas in the fall of 1917, only 5.1 percent short of the
ten million acre goal.
While the steel blade of the plow overturned
thousands of acres of prairie sod, State Board and KSAC
agronomists called for a maximization of production per
acre. L. E. Call of KSAC encouraged early and extensive
preparation of the seed bed. Farmers were asked to plow
their stubble and fallow land as soon after the summer
harvest as possible, preferably mid-July. Working the
ground in this manner killed weeds, saved soil moisture
and liberated plant food from the earth. Call suggested
tilling to a depth of six to eight inches and leaving
surface clods to prevent wind erosion.
"Let us use the spreader" was one of the more
humorous slogans of the wheat soldier in the effort to
44
increase yields. Traditionally the clay loam and loam
soil of Kansas had not needed fertilizer to grow hard red
winter wheat. KSAC advocated increased use of manure and
lime to maximize output. Unfortunately farmers were
removed from commercial supplies of limestone and stone
crushers. L. E. Call promoted cooperative purchases of
crushing equipment among groups of farmers with access to
limestone.
In tandem with the seed bed preparation were efforts
to combat the Hessian fly, wheat smut and other plant
maladies. The problem was so acute in the eastern half
of the state that Waters called for an extra ten
entomologists from the United States Department of
Agriculture. In coordination with the Insect Committee
of the Council of Defense these specialists divided the
problem areas into several districts and confronted the
Hessian fly. They instructed farmers to plow early and
deep, to treat their seed with anti-pest chemical, to
destroy volunteer wheat that was infested and to avoid
planting early if the weather was unseasonably warm.
With the seed wheat crisis solved and the ground
thoroughly prepared the soldiers of the soil planted the
golden kernels which would help bring American victory.
Continental weather extremities could purge the crop from
the ground with brutal cold and ravenous wind. Dry
weather in the fall of 1917 caused concern: late fall
45
rains created some relief. Farmers Mail and Breeze
reported that "Many times the usual amount" of wheat was
being sown. The wheat conscripts could only go into
winter camp hoping that a blanket of snow would protect
the crop until spring.
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Power Farming: The Rise of Mechanized Agriculture
To expand wheat acreage dynamically Kansas growers
embraced mechanized agriculture. It was a move to
economy of scale then known as power farming. Horse and
mule numbers peaked in 1919, beasts of burden were still
commonly used on most Kansas farms in World War I.
Animal power was important, but the draft horse had many
limitations which could be erased by the internal
combustion engine. To introduce wheat onto thousands of
acres of virgin prairie was only possible through the
wholesale use of tractors. This account from the
1917-1918 Report of the State Board of Agriculture is
indicative of the praise for this new implement:
The farmers were able to make such a showing
in the last year of the war only through the
more extensive employment of modern machinery,
[such] as the tractor, the number of which
has probably doubled in the last year. 1
Horse power became unattractive for several reasons,
When war was declared the National Army immediately
purchased 250,000 horses. A full complement of draft
animals for each million men in the army was 325,000
2horses and 100,000 mules. The market for animals was
essential and profitable. Another impetus for using the
48
tractor was the increased cost of feed and fodder.
Horses also had to be rested frequently, a fact that
mitigated the call for early planting as it would be too
hot for horses to work long hours in the late July heat.
Horses and mules had to be continually groomed and
deloused to prevent sickness. Draft animals were steady
but slow, a man on a tractor could plow 5-10 more acres
per day than a man with a four horse team (tractor 10-15
acres and team 4-5 acres) . Only the tractor could
3dramatically expand cultivated acreage.
A wartime boom in tractor purchases made the machine
"one of the oustanding factors in the agricultural
4history ... of Kansas." Journals and newspapers were
choked with advertisements promoting the use of the
machines. Soon farmers of the tallgrass and shortgrass
prairies alike had nearly eliminated the natural habitat
of many areas, making the land more susceptible to soil
erosion. Trainloads of tractors were being shipped in
the southwest regions of the state, despite shortages
of heavy equipment created by the demands of the armed
forces. On one Morton County ranch 3,000 acres of
pasture on one ranch was converted to wheat land. A
Rice County "wheat king" had twenty tractors operating
on his land. Headlights were attached to the machines to
allow for nighttime farming. Many farmers who had moved
elsewhere came back to Kansas to make their fortune in
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wheat. The wartime emergency had sparked the shift to
mechanization: Hoover and others believed the movement
towards mechanization was simply expedited by war
conditions.
Society was increasingly urbanized, industry and
military conscription had begun to siphon farm labor
from the state. Human and animal energy were increasingly
replaced by the machine. Wartime mobilization agencies
attempted to fully develop this revolutionary source of
power. Kansas Farmer prodded the farmer: "If he owns a
tractor, in most cases there are days when he can use it
to help out a neighbor, without seriously interfering
7
with his own work."
J. C. Mohler, who was to become a stalwart secretary
of the State Board, was in charge of the "Horse and
Machine Power Committee" for the Council of Defense. His
committee found there was an estimated 3,932 tractors in
the state when America entered the war in April 1917.
Some 92 percent of these machines were classified as being
in "good or fair" condition and each tractor only operated
an average 41 days per year. The State Council wanted to
increase the operational use of tractors.
Tractor clubs were organized, and meetings and
shows were held to demonstrate and inform the rural
public about power farming. KSAC agricultural engineering
students partially comprised the emergency team of
50
mechanics organized by the Council of Defense.
Correspondence courses formed by KSAC helped train
mechanics and tractor drivers. Experienced tractor
operators were recruited into teams which traversed the
state to assist farmers with the machines. Women such
as the Jayhawk Tractor Girls of the University of Kansas
were included in the contingent of tractor experts.
Information was widely distributed by the media on
proper maintenance methods for the iron monsters which
invaded the prairie. Farmers were informed of the
benefits of storing tractors in sheds, painting their
machines and operating cautiously in cold weather, as the
p
metal would be more fragile. Tractor operators received
practical advice such as not to fill the gas tank while
smoking, not to run the equipment at high speeds, or to
ride the clutch or race the engine. Normal repair costs
were estimated at four percent of the cost of the tractor
per year. Fuel and maintenance costs would equal the
9
original price of tractors in nine years.
Tractors had come into their own; as each day passed
the farmers adapted to their complexities. Kansas farmers
were encouraged to tailor their tractor purchase to the
size and terrain of their property. Even though military
demands would lessen available numbers of tractors,
their use in nighttime and with proper maintenance made
up for the shortage. Farmers were advised to keep a
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stock of good draft animals and to plan careful plowing
patterns before working a field.
Power farming was a mixed blessing. Tractors and
combines replaced labor lost to non-farming pursuits and
allowed for the massive expansion of cultivated acreage
and more efficient transportation with trucks, tractor
pulled trailers, and better roads. By the end of the war
in November 1918 the number of tractors in the state had
increased from 3,932 to 8,689. By 1920 that number had
increased to 17,177. The value of machinery in the state
rose from $48,310,000 in 1910 to $154,716,000 in 1920, or
12320 percent. By 1919 over half the farms in Kansas
used tractors, along with headers, binders, threshers,
13discs and other modern implements.
Mechanization proved to be a major strategic weapon
of the wheat campaign; but tractors created their own
problems. For the first time "Reliance on machine power
meant ... a significant level of inputs from non
agricultural industries were being applied on the farm.
Farmers were no longer producing their own power by
. . 14
raising horses and mules."
Mechanization meant a new drain on bank accounts
for equipment purchases, repairs and fuel. Farmers were
forced into credit financing. Its consequences in the
post-war deflation period when land values plunged were
serious. To pay for the new machines farmers continued
52
to break new sod. The war directly contributed to the
expansion of farm land, it increased neglect of soil
conserving practices and contributed to the subsequent
"dust bowl" experience of the 1930s. Power farming had
arrived in Kansas, for better or worse.
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Recruiting Soldiers; Labor Problems in the
Summer of 1918
Mechanized farming was crucial to the expansion of
wheat acreage, but labor was needed to harvest the crop
in the summer of 1918. Governor Capper predicted 60 to
100 thousand workers would be needed for a ten to twenty
day period in addition to labor already on the farm.
The State Council of Defense made a patriotic appeal to
"save every acre of wheat" through the mobilization of
labor. Recruiting soldiers for the Wheat Army involved
national policy, statewide emergency regulation, disputes
with organized labor and a call up of women, children,
city dwellers and indigent persons to help with the
harvest.
Labor was in short supply due to several disruptions
created by war. Fifty to sixty thousand transient laborers
usually encamped in the state at harvest had been absorbed
by wartime industry. Munitions and shipbuilding recruiters
had lured many workers from the state with high wages and
the appeal of city life. Also one-fourth of the American
Expeditionary Force was composed of farmers, including
approximately 77,00 Kansans who joined the Army, Navy or
56
Marines. Mexican labor left the state after rumors
2
circulated they would be eligible for conscription.
Loss of skilled agricultural workers was a major
concern in the state. Many political leaders including
Hoover and Capper, called for a blanket deferment of
skilled farmers. Capper believed conscription had
unfairly impacted upon agriculture and called for a
return to the soil from burgeoning urban industry.
Farming was 15-20 percent low in skilled labor,
3
particularly tractor and combine operators.
Capper wrote to Woodrow Wilson insisting "under
present drafting methods there is no intelligent selection
between the key essential, trained and experienced farmers
and the unskilled, non-essential men of the farms and
small towns. Many farmers were skilled because they
had spent their entire lives learning how to farm. It
would be difficult to replace them with untrained labor.
The Kansas Farmer had both the national and the local
audience in mind when it reported that the war "is not
simply the army which will fight Germany . . . the Kansas
boy who stays behind the plow is performing perhaps a
greater service to his country than the one who goes into
training camp and finally takes his place in the
trenches." State Commissioner of Labor P. J. McBride
appealed to Wilson for an exemption for farmers: "We
believe the saving of our wheat crop is just as
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important ... as the building of ships." Apparently the
appeal to Wilson fell on deaf ears; Kansas would be
forced to mobilize labor to save the crop from shattering
7
in the field. Nonetheless many young farmers eventually
would not be conscripted into the armed forces, though
2,500 Kansans died in service to the nation.
Several measures were enacted to handle the expected
labor shortage by the war mobilization agencies, including
the Department of Agriculture, the Agricultural Experiment
Stations, the State Labor Commissioner, the Council of
Defense, several newspapers and railroad companies.
E. V. Wilcox of the Office of Farm Management in
Washington, D.C. forwarded a national plan to cope with
the labor shortage. It called for an immediate survey
to ascertain the amount of labor needed and the amount of
labor available to help with the harvest.
The plan advocated a return of men from the city to
the country and a mobilization of retired farmers,
vagrants, merchants and teachers. School children and
women were also expected to be of great service in the
effort to save wheat. Key to the plan was efficient
utilization of time and resources. The labor drive also
called upon the patriotic devotion to get the wheat from
the field. A compulsory labor spirit was reinforced by a
strict interpretation of labor laws; transients and
unemployed were forced to sign up for the harvest crew.
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(He who does not work does not eat!) The Farm Labor
Board encouraged Mexicans, Puerto Ricans and blacks to
come help with the harvest, but had to admonish citizens
g
to treat non-whites with respect.
After the fall planting in 1917 Kansas wheat producers
and state officials had concentrated on the impending
labor campaign. The Farmers Mail and Breeze , a Capper
publication, wrote on 10 November 1917: "There is no use
in one trying to delude himself into believing that there
9
will be an abundant labor supply next year."
A survey taken that same month of 1,000 farmers
indicated 604 were "short" of help, 169 "very short," and
only 165 replied that help was "plentiful." "Farmers
everywhere . . . complaining about their inability to get
help . . . ," wrote State Farm Labor Chief E. V. Frizell,
"If we wait for the government to supply the harvest
hands we will no doubt lose the crop."
Growers were asked to plan their labor needs and to
cooperate with other farmers. Each county tabulated
needs and listed available workers. On 10 May 1918
Governor Capper called for 60,000 boys to join the
"Harvest Army." "Topeka patriots," mostly businessmen,
pledged 214,000 working hours to the harvest. Among the
"twilight harvesters" were the employees of Capper
Publications. Churches also preached a unified theme of
"harvest sermons," "exclaiming to parishioners that wheat
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can't wait." On 20 May 1918 8,160 persons signed up on
12
a state-wide campaign to enlist harvesters.
Henry Waters mentioned in the official history of the
State Council of Defense that "high-school boys were given
the opportunity to devote their vacation time and other
13idle hours to the production of food." Boys between 16
and 21 who were physically fit were recruited by the
United States Boy's Working Reserve to receive training
14
and an "attractive button" promoting the wheat campaign.
This "great army of boys" was supplemented by the
female contingent of the Wheat Army. Women had always
been an essential foundation in Kansas farm life. They
responded to the war emergency by assuming responsibility
for even a greater portion of work. One mobilization
vehicle was the canning club organization and other
women's groups were ready for total involvement in the
wheat campaign when the war began. The Topeka Journal
reported "Kansas women want in the war game. They want
to shoulder the musket and go into the ranks." W. A.
Bolinger, a western Kansas representative of the State
Council of Defense, wrote to Governor Capper that in the
Hays area: "The women were in the field instead of cooking
and the fare served is the kind that could be expected
under such conditions."
The Industrialist headlined the claim "Cooperation
by Women Will Largely Win the War." The KSAC paper noted
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"Girls will find it more enjoyable riding a binder in the
wheat fields . . . than clerking in a store." It would
not be an understatement to assert that women were
17
indispensable to the mobilization of labor.
Hard physical labor was still the domain of men and
the labor campaign concentrated on bringing workers into
the state. National publications, such as the Chicago
Daily News opened "Farm Labor Recruiting Stations" to
direct harvest hands into the wheat producing regions of
the U.S. Special trains offered reduced rates on credit
terms to workers seeking transport to Kansas and other
wheat states. Governor Capper appealed to the national
Army to release men to help bring in the crop; several
hundred men received furloughs from Camp Funston to
1
8
assist with the harvest.
With labor in such short supply workers were able to
ask a premium price for their services, much to the
dismay of wheat growers. Along the railway line from
Russell to Oakley 500 men were needed to supplement the
harvest ranks. Farmers were incensed when often they
would "feed a man for a week, only to [have him] walk
19
away when work began."
In March of 1918 a farmer's conference met to set
a pay scale that would give five to six dollars per day.
By harvest time workers were asking for six to seven
dollars per day and it was feared that that rate would
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increase to seven to eight if something was not done to
halt the wage spiral. Growers were bitter that the
harvest hand problem was "demoralized by [a] few farmers
offering high prices." One could hardly expect that a
harvest hand would not ask for as much as he could
20
receive.
Organized labor, particularly the IWW and its
consorts, were viewed as a powerful enemy by farmers and
politicians alike. IWW President Wm. "Big Bill" Haywood
had initiated a drive to enlist harvest labor in the union
in early 1916 and as previously mentioned, the "One Big
Union" claimed a membership of 18,000 in the grain belt by
the fall of 1916. The IWW provoked "fear and anger" in
Kansas, where the concern was IWW infiltration into the
"hobo jungles" which provided much of the harvest labor
pool. Governor Capper asked the people to "suppress
promptly any effort ... of the IWW or any other labor
agitators to interfere with the wheat harvest." Kansans
were well aware of the Chicago trial of the IWW where one
witness revealed a "reign of terror" was planned for
21Kansas in 1918.
Capper and U.S. Attorney Fred Robertson used
vagrancy and "criminal syndicalist" laws to break IWW
organization in Kansas. Less radical unions such as the
American Federation of Labor were approached in a
conciliatory manner to decouple them from the IWW
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extremists. Aversion to the IWW and their programs
created an anti-labor opinion in the state which has
22prevailed to this day.
The Harvest Army Generals successfully counter-
attacked the inroads of the IWW. Over 200 "Home Guard"
companies protected the wheatfields of Kansas in the
summer of 1918. Though a few incidents of sabotage
occurred, the harvest labor force was effectively sifted
of "wobblies." One indictment against the IWW charged
"seditious conspiracy" to obstruct the flow of war goods,
especially wheat and oil. Instead of rallying workers
23
the IWW seemed to unite the Wheat Army.
As a result of patriotic appeal, effective
organization, and mobilization of labor the harvest was
a success. According to the State Council of Defense,
not a single acre of wheat was lost for want of labor.
The labor campaign was a salient feature in the pragmatic
mobilization of Kansas. Society had united to "Win the
War with Wheat." Still, Capper found after the war:
"Those in charge of the food campaign did not seem to
realize that it is not easy to draft large numbers of
24
unskilled people into farm work."
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Savings, Standards, Storage and Shipping
Due to harsh weather in the winter of 1917-1918 the
1918 wheat harvest did not meet the 200 million bushel
goal. Of the 9.8 million acres planted in the fall of
1917 only 6.8 million was harvested for a final tally of
93 million bushels, still three times the amount of wheat
the entire U.S. had exported in the previous year. The
average yield per acre was 14.1 bushels, one less than
the national average. The crop was valued at 185 million
dollars, over 100 million dollars more than the crop in
1917. 1
Nearly two million bushels of grain worth 14 million
dollars was saved by the reduction of waste in the harvest
process. Cutting back swaths and raking shock rows
provided additional staples for the nation's coffers.
One man made 500 dollars cleaning wheat rows, reminding
people that one bushel of wheat could provide several
weeks worth of bread for a single person. Farmers
harvested more straw, which contained two percent of the
plant's grain after harvest; they also used canvas or
solid bottom beds on their grain wagons so grain would
not be lost in crevices. The Council of Defense asked
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growers to sweep out machines and to make sure the
thresher or combine was properly adjusted to prevent
waste. These measures cut significantly into unnecessary
losses estimated to total one-half million bushels in
1916. 2
Governor Capper received many complaints from wheat
growers "to the effect that there is a great difference
in the price they are receiving from different purchasers
3in the same community." Elevator owners suspected of
shorting their customers were reported to the Food
Administration, who ordered one D. E. Bondurant of
Ransom to repay fifty farmers who had been paid seven
cents per bushel less than the two dollar guarantee. To
farmers with several thousand bushel this could mean a
great sum of money. Governor Capper often wrote letters
4
of reprimand to purchasers paying illegally low prices.
Strict new grain standards also caused resentment in
rural Kansas in 1918. As part of the U.S. Grain Standards
Act winter wheat was now graded in six classes, each of
which was valued differently under new price control
legislation. Grade 1# was to have a "dark, hard vitreous
kernel" and was worth two dollars per bushel. Most of
the wheat in Kansas was expected to be categorized as
Grade 1#. Licensed inspectors with new equipment were to
enforce the new grading system, and there was an appeals
provision in the new rules.
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Farmers tended to oppose uniform standards created
to improve the quality of the nation's food supply. They
viewed it as an attempt to renege on the promise of two
dollar wheat. Farmers felt the rule was arbitrary because
testing procedures were not well-developed on the local
level. Growers organized meetings to protest the new
standards, especially Chief Inspector for Kansas, George
Ross.
Ross was reviled as a "traitor" by such farm leaders
as Rodney Elward of the Russell area. Ross responded by
saying the protest was a failure to accept to modern
demands of food quality. Kansas wheat was known to have
an excess amount of dockage; debris in the grain such as
dust, chaff, and weed seed. Governor Capper sided with
Ross but the protest continued to build. A meeting was
held among farmers, millers and inspectors to discuss
differences in the grain grading crisis. Eventually all
sides involved reached agreement and the essence of the
new rules was left intact, with some modifications to meet
war conditions. The number of subclasses were reduced,
thereby raising the rating of ordinary grades so that
Kansas farmers would have about thirty percent more wheat
7in the two dollar Grade 1# category.
Grain storage was also undergoing innovation in the
war period. New metal and concrete granaries were being
built across the state to increase storage capacity on
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the farm. In ordinary conditions farmers would store
their crop and wait for a post-harvest rise in prices
before dumping their grain on the market. With the price
guarantee farmers were overloading railheads and
elevators. The government which had sent federal agents
to confiscate grain the previous year was now forced to
encourage farmers to hold a portion of their crop on the
farm.
A final barrier to the wheat campaign was the actual
transportation of the crop to market centers. Arthur
Capper wrote to the U.S. Railroad Administration
complaining "elevators lacked cars" and in some places
9gram was piling up on the ground. William C. Mullendore
of the Food Administration wrote after the war:
In the early part of September 1918 it
became apparent that on account of the
phenomenal movement of wheat caused by
a guaranteed price and large crop . . .
the storage capacity at all markets was
rapidly decreasing and within the space
of a week or ten days the terminals
would be blocked with grain. 10
The railways were under military control during the
war. A permit system was arranged to ease the flow of
wheat onto major rail lines. Also an active drive to
increase the load per car helped eliminate the stress on
the nation's railways. A major rebuilding effort also
helped solve the transport emergency as did 200
locomotives that had been destined for Russia which
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weren't sent because -of the revolutions producing the
Soviet Union after October 1917.
Another railway problem which was condemned by wheat
growers was the emergency allowance of a 25 percent rate
increase. Capper feared the steep rise in rates would be
continued after the war and "wipe out the jobbing
centers" of the state. The rail companies claimed they
needed the extra capital to construct 100,000 new cars
that would revitalize the American rail system. Railroad
freight traffic in Kansas in 1918 totaled 62.8 million
tons at a rate cost of 81.7 million dollars. Railway
revenues for the year in Kansas exceeded expenses by
12
nearly 26 million dollars.
Highway transport, the new alternative to the
railway, was still underdeveloped in Kansas though
funding for roads increased from 5 million in 1917 to 10
13
million dollars in 1918. Motor trucks and tractors were
used extensively to haul grain into the local elevators.
The Council of Defense organized a "motor truck service"
to establish rate guidelines and to locate drivers and
mechanics. In the future motor transport was to become
14
very important to the agricultural economy of Kansas.
With their product entering the nation's lifeline
the Wheat Soldiers could be satisfied with the work they
had accomplished. They had fought hard to provide
America and the allies with the fundamental sinews of
70
war. Organization, patriotism, government price support
and power farming had allowed for a massive expansion of
acreage and defeated several crises; including the seed
wheat problem, the labor crisis and difficulties with
storage, grain standards and transportation. The
"friction" of war had been overcome in a state whose
motto befits its performance in the wheat campaign "Ad
Astra Per Aspra"— "To the Stars through Difficulty."
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Conclusion
J. C. Mohler, a state leader in the wheat campaign,
summed the emotions of the state at war's end by quoting
a "noted economist" at the 1918 meeting of the State
Board of Agriculture:
Wheat, the source of the staff of
life; the cheapest and best of all our
American foods; the deciding factor in
the war; the greatest single element in
the conclusion of peace, and to-day the
strongest bar against Bolshevism.
In the war years 1914-1918 Kansas producers grew 43
percent more food than in the four years which preceded
the conflict, "well above the national average," in spite
of some of the worst growing conditions since the 1880s.
Kansas farmers were the vanguard in the nation's effort
to increase food need to sustain the war mobilization.
In the fall of 1918 Kansans planted a record 11.6 million
bushels of winter wheat.
Kansas was zealous for the cause, which panned out
in a significant contribution to the 33.9 million metric
tons of food stocks which the U.S. provided for Europe in
2
the war. This immense supply of caloric sustenance was
among the greatest examples of America's grand strategic
74
power. American food ranked in importance beside the
money, munitions, and men the U.S. provided for the Allies.
British tommies, French polius and American doughboys were
kept alive in the trenches by war bread and bully beef
from the great agricultural heartland of North America.
Industrial workers in Europe and the U.S. did not riot in
the streets, such as those in St. Petersburg in the fall
of 1917. As the old Russian proverb has it, "well fed
horses don't rampage."
Food mobilization was accomplished only through
"revolutionary" control over the free market. It
reflected the rise of the bureaucratic state, railways,
industry and food production came under strict government
supervision. Herbert Hoover proved to be an effective and
well-liked national leader. Under his guidance the
sprawling railways, shipyards, flour mills and farms of
America meshed into a food production machine that became
a significant strategic weapon.
Particularly important to the wheat campaign of
1917-1918 was the guarantee. of two dollar per bushel
wheat by the U.S. Congress and its agent, the U.S. Grain
Corporation. Prices were a continual worry to farmers;
the first direct intervention of the federal government
in the market was highly effective in raising more wheat,
though price control did not occur without problems.
Farmers thought that the enemy was the "middleman" who
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profited excessively by speculation and inflating food
prices. Price control helped ease the strain between
countryside and the expansive metropolis. Government
intervention was based on the progressive legislative
action which grew out of the Theodore Roosevelt presidency.
A guarantee of two dollar wheat insured that wheat growers
would sufficiently expand their wheat acreage, despite
problems regarding grain standards in the months preceding
the 1918 harvest.
Effective government intervention also helped solve
the transportation and labor problems which threatened the
crop of 1918. Governor Capper failed to convince
President Wilson to defer many skilled farmers, but
rebounded and fought the battle without much help from
Washington.
Organizational leadership on the state-wide level
was also of exceptional importance to the wheat campaign.
Mobilization was carried out through the executive and
legislative branches of the Kansas government, the State
Board of Agriculture, the USDA, KSAC and its extension
networks and experiment stations. Private individuals,
industries, publishing firms and businesses contributed
their resources and talents in the drive to increase food
production. Women, children, city dwellers, retired
farmers, teachers, blacks, Mexicans, and other groups all
provided labor for the Wheat Army. Council of Defense
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members were volunteers who controlled the mobilization
at a minimal cost and without creating a self-perpetuating
bureaucracy. Nonetheless the war provided a forecast of
the modern activist government.
The American war effort was truly a centrifugal
mobilization rooted at the township and county level.
Hundreds of committees were created to survey and oversee
various and sundry problems and programs associated with
the wheat campaign.
The pre-war institutions devoted to the development
of agriculture, KSAC and the State Board, provided
specific ideas and solid leadership in the wheat production
movement. Agents of the State Board and scientists and
educators from KSAC gave instruction on how to increase
yield per acre, fight insects, use fertilizer and repair
tractors. Science was mixed with frontier common sense to
maximize production and profit for Kansas farmers. KSAC
certainly lived up to its motto, "Rule by Obeying Nature's
Laws .
"
Surveys, statistics and the modern professional ethic
was one of the legacies of the war period. Efficient
organization helped tackle the seed wheat and labor
problem and advanced the mechanization of farming. KSAC
leadership included nationally recognized Henry J. Waters,
William Jardine, "J.C." Mohler and L. E. Call. KSAC
established an Agricultural Economics Department after the
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war to further serve Kansas farmers under the provisions
of the 1862 Hatch Act which established land grant
colleges in the U.S. The organizational history of the
wheat campaign suggests the need for emergency plans on
the local, state and federal level for expansion of
agricultural output in war or in periods of potential
famine.
Patriotism, combat elan, was as essential to the
success of the wheat campaign as any government program.
Governor Capper roused constituents with continual appeals
to the state to sacrifice and work harder for the nation,
especially for the "boys at the front." Popular slogans
were circulated by the state and national propaganda
organs, including the journalistic empire of Arthur
Capper. Among some favored slogans: "Win the War with
Wheat!," "Food—Grow It to Help Whip the Huns!," and
"Slap Kaiser Bill with a Pork Chop!" Farmers Mail and
Breeze provided an airy justification for war: "The
farmer everywhere is a warrior when war is the only thing
3
that will make him free."
Cooperation and consecration in the wheat campaign
achieved some outstanding results. A spirit of community
would make the war memory vivid in the state; countless
memorials were built to commemorate the "Great War";
aging veterans sold red paper poppies near the time of
every Memorial Day.
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Kansas farms produced 507 million dollars worth of
food products in World War I. Kansas produced wheat,
corn, pork, beef, fruit and honey. Kansas also supplied
munitions, coal, petroleum and soldiers. Citizens of
Kansas had the highest bank deposits per capita in the
U.S., and participation in conservation, gardening, war
bond purchases and other "volunteer" activities.
Unanimity was molded through public schools and
speeches by Governor Capper and other leaders. Even the
motion picture industry, then at birth, had a role to
play in morale building among the wheat soldiers.
Thousands of acres of sod which had
lain undisturbed through the centuries,
beaten down by rains and the hooves of
thousands of buffaloes, stubborn and
unyielding to other implements, is giving
way to the new steel power. Without the
tractor this miracle would not be
possible.
*
The war had "both revealed and exploited a tremendous
reserve power for agricultural production." After the
war the expansion continued. Pasture land worth ten
dollars an acre before the war was valued at $100.00 per
acre. Tractors and combines meant industrialized farming,
an uncontrollable move to economy of scale— since known
as the agricultural style of the American midwest.
Tractors had built-in costs such as purchase price,
maintenance, and fuel. Farmers were forced to embrace
credit financing; from 1915-1917 capital expansion on
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Kansas farms was accomplished largely with 72 percent
borrowed money. When grain prices dropped after the war
farmers had continually to expand acreage to pay for
equipment that had been purchased with credit secured by
acquiring overvalued land. A similar cycle would occur in
the 1970s and early 1980s.
Post-war deflation and continuous expansion of wheat
land led to a severe exploitation and neglect of the land.
As early as the fall of 1917 the dust clouds of the 1930s
were on the horizon.
World War I capped the "golden age" of agriculture.
The number of farms in the state decreased from 110,108
7in 1910 to 97,040 in 1920. Capital investment increased
g
51.4 percent in the same period. The value of land and
crops also made significant gains. Labor, machinery and
fertilizer costs also increased substantially. Farm debt
in the U.S. increased from 4.7 to 8.5 billion dollars and
9
Kansas debt rose at about the same rate. Kansas bank
deposits rose 50 percent from 1915 to 1917 when over 225
million dollars were deposited in Kansas banks.
World War I created many wheat "kings" with thousands
of acres of the grain planted on giant acreages. Farmers
unable to pay loans the previous two years suddenly had
the cash to pay in full and still buy a new Ford. Wheat
indexed at 100 in 1914 reached 249 in 1917, but dropped
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to 234 in 1918 and continued to decline to a low of 74 in
121939.
Agricultural efficiency meant fewer farmers and more
grain. After a return to normalcy Kansas wheat was in
less demand. As is often the case the producers of primary
agricultural products were the first to suffer from
depression. The economic cycle of overproduction has
13
"afflicted American agriculture ever since."
Henry Waters had foreseen the post-war economic
problems in 1916. In a letter to the National Foreign
Trade Council he said, "It seems very likely . . . that we
shall be placed in a very awkward position after the war
assuming normal crops in Canada, Australia, New Zealand,
India and China, as well as in this country. A radical
decline in the price of farm products will seriously
disturb our whole social and industrial balance."
Kansas truly became part of the world economy. The
State Board and Governor Capper called for diversification
from wheat into livestock and industry. Capper was
concerned with returning soldiers to civilian life,
construction of more roads, prohibition of alcoholic
beverages and providing credit and education to family
farmers
.
Kansas provided nearly one-fifth of the nation's
wheat in World War I. The wheat crop acreage of 1918
could have covered several small states in the northeastern
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U.S. A pragmatic mobilization had occurred in the state,
Patriotism provided emphasis and the organization of the
wheat campaign reached into every home in the state.
Leaders of government, agriculture, finance, education,
industry and women's groups ran the mobilization with
professional efficiency. War spirit and organization
overcame the seed, labor and transportation difficulties
magnified by the course of war. Kansans sacrificed and
worked to attain the national goal—victory—by "Winning
the War with Wheat."
Journalist Charles Moreau Harger provided an
eloquent epitaph to the mighty Wheat Army of 1917-1918:
Of all the discussion and of the imperative
considerations of our strength and safety
this fundamental truth stands: The farmer
has the nation's weal at heart and to the
extent of his ability will be a good soldier,
the soldier of the wheatfield— as important
today as the soldier on the field of battle. l^
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"Wheat Soldiers: The Wartime Wheat Campaign in
Kansas, 1917-1918" is the story of the efforts to increase
grain production in Kansas during World War I. Wheat was
a valuable strategic commodity in the "Great War," as one
of the leading states in winter wheat production Kansas
led the drive to harvest record amounts of this vital
staple. Every aspect of society was subjugated to the
wartime mobilization.
The wheat campaign in Kansas was a successful effort
though the food drive had faced many challenges. Wheat
growers were concerned about prices, seed supply, grain
standards, transportation and lack of labor. These
problems were handled by several factors which made the
wheat campaign a success: effective organization from the
national to community level was combined with patriotism
to increase the production and conservation of food. To
lessen concern over equitable prices the federal
government guaranteed wheat producers two dollars per
bushel. Tough new grain grading standards were relaxed
to account for the war emergency. Seed wheat supplies
were located by the war mobilization agencies and
purchases were financed by both private and government
loans
.
Growers were encouraged to increase production per
acre and to expand acreage where possible. Kansas State
Agricultural College (KSAC) agronomists urged farmers to
prepare their seed beds early and thoroughly and to use
fertilizers to grow more per acre. The primary emphasis
was the expansion of acreage. The goal was for Kansas to
plant ten million acres in the fall of 1917. To plant
such vast acreages to wheat mechanized farming,
particularly tractors, were employed on a large scale.
The war heightened the move towards "power farming."
The "wheat soldiers" of Kansas faced a harsh winter
in 1917-1918 as well as a major labor shortage to harvest
the crop in the early summer of 1918. A labor campaign
mobilized out of state labor, city dwellers, school
children, women and vagrants to help harvest the crop.
Another crisis ensued when the railway system could not
absorb the bumper crop. This problem was solved by a
system of permits which lessened the flow of grain from
the countryside to rail terminals.
Though poor weather damaged the crop and kept Kansas
from reaching its 200 million bushel goal for 1918, the
wartime wheat campaign was an overall success. The wheat
army of Kansas united to achieve the common goal of more
food for America and its allies. It was a pragmatic
mobilization which emphasized the volunteer progressive
spirit and effective professional leadership of the
period.
